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Leadership, process  
and outcome  
The June 2012 EU summit might 
well come to be seen, in retrospect, 
as a major turning point in the 
management of the euro zone crisis, 
and not necessarily because it 
adopted decisions that will bring an 
end to it, although some important 
ones have indeed been finalised (as 
this issue of BEPA Monthly Brief 
illustrates). No: the turning point lies 
rather, and above all, in the first 
open manifestation of shared 
leadership at the EU level – shared 
between institutions as well as 
among member states. 
All too often, over the past two 
years, had the search (and quest) for 
individual winners and losers, leaders 
and followers, shaped the approach 
to policy- and decision-making at 
continental level and its perception 
by the media and the wider public. 
Last week, by contrast, both the run-
up to the European Council – with 
the joint Report by the “four 
Presidents” – and its actual 
unfolding and conclusions offered a 
display of unity of purpose and 
readiness to compromise for the 
common good that had sometimes 
been lacking previously. The 
apparent return to a rule-based 
(rather than power-based) approach 
to  de l ibe r a t ions  and  the i r 
implementation, along with the well-
orchestrated approach of the main 
institutional players (each one 
according to his instruments), 
represent in fact a promising 
development for EU economic crisis 
management. 
The case for sharing  
Inspired teamwork always pays off, 
as also the Euro 2012 football 
championship showed. The notion 
and the practice of “shared 
leadership” have increasingly 
become a source of attention and 
praise among political analysts, social 
experts, business and management 
moguls, behavioural scientists and 
even evolutionary biologists. Shared 
leadership occurs – they claim – 
when group members actively and 
intentionally shift the role of leader 
to one another as needed by the 
environment or circumstances in 
which the group operates, thus 
superseding the more traditional 
m o d e l s  ( c h a r i s m a t i c , 
transformationial, contextual) where 
influence and decision-making travel 
downstream – vertically – and are 
often based on zero-sum games. 
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Warren Bennis, the dean of contemporary 
leadership studies, likes in particular to 
emphasise that shared leadership comes to the 
fore in the wake of some defining experience (a 
“crucible”, in his words) that requires adaptive 
capacity, creative problem-solving, and 
collaborative coalition-building, thus making the 
best possible use of adversity. Globalisation and 
technology, for their part, create a context and 
climate in which information is always flooding 
in and there is no final analysis, only constant 
evaluation and re-evaluation: of data, of course, 
but also of symbols, values, mind-sets. Action 
becomes one more way to gather information, 
which in turn becomes the basis for further 
action. In such a world, leaders cannot depend 
on maps: they need compasses – and they also 
need, as never before, allies. 
There has been no shortage of “crucibles” for 
EU leaders and institutions lately – and many 
challenges and obstacles remain. Yet it seems 
only sensible to address those that stem from a 
shared currency – and related shared sovereignty 
– with shared leadership. We can only hope that 
the positive feedback from this summit 
consolidates this new dynamic – just like the 
iterated simulation of the famous game based on 
the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma” proved the 
superior strategic benefits of cooperative 
behaviour over naked, self-centred competition. 
A name for the (end)game? 
The joint Report presented by the four 
Presidents on the eve of the European Council 
illustrated a number of distinct policy 
“frameworks” which, taken together, could 
amount to a political project that would( at least 
in part) supersede the current treaty. The summit 
conclusions even include a commitment to 
identify those elements of further integration 
that would require treaty change. Less than three 
years after Lisbon’s entry into force, the prospect 
of substantially reviewing and adapting its 
provisions is no longer taboo. 
Just a few days before the June summit an 
informal group of 10 EU Foreign Ministers 
chaired by Germany’s Guido Westerwelle even 
released a statement on the future of Europe 
highlighting the reforms that may be necessary – 
especially in the medium and long term – to 
improve efficiency, solidarity and legitimacy in 
EU action both inside and outside Europe. 
Around the same time, the Paris-based think 
tank Notre Europe reframed and relaunched 
Jacques Delors’ old idea of the Union as a 
“federation of Nation-states”. For her part, 
Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding 
insists that the ongoing reform of euro zone 
governance should lead to a “European 
federation”. And while www.europa.eu still 
describes the Union – perhaps a bit too narrowly 
– as “a unique economic and political partnership 
between 27 European countries”, academics 
keep discussing the extent to which it can be 
defined as a “polity” in its own right or rather as 
“a federal union of states”. 
The point is not whether and how far theory has 
to fit reality (or vice-versa). The point is that the 
reality is evolving so fast that, indeed, old maps 
do not offer adequate guidance any more.  
Neither do abstract one-size-fits-all notions that 
often fail to capture the complexity of what did, 
might or should happen. Equally unhelpful is the 
recurrent tendency in some key member states to 
see the only possible future shape of the EU as a 
projection of their own system “writ large”. 
A new compass may thus soon prove necessary, 
and it may require a more open cross-border 
debate about how far we Europeans are ready to 
go in pooling sovereignty, democracy and 
responsibility.  
However promising, the emerging practice of 
shared leadership cannot per se represent an 
outcome although, as a process, it is essential to 
build mutual confidence and produce acceptable 
results. And if an ideological debate about the 
finalité politique of European integration may 
prove divisive, a frank discussion about our 
common future may prove inevitable – and 
ultimately helpful in shaping (and sharing) it.  
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Like all the previous ones since the debt crisis 
erupted in the EU, the European Council of 28-29 
June 2012 was surrounded by expectations about 
its possible outcome. The meeting was preceded by 
a letter of intent signed by the so-called “four 
Presidents”, in which they provided a “roadmap” 
to a banking union, a partial fiscal union, and the 
so-called Growth Pact. The letter was sufficiently 
general in the wording to be a good negotiating 
platform whilst also being sufficiently clear about 
the fact that “Eurobonds” were off the table.  
The agreement reached at the summit has in 
common with previous ones a number of features: 
the comprehensive approach (as it looks at 
financial, fiscal and growth issues); the mix of 
different measures (of which some are short-term 
and others more long-term); and the generality of 
the final statement (which leaves complex but 
crucial technical details unsaid). This time around, 
however, the package enshrines an important 
element that makes it different – at least potentially 
– from previous ones: the first step towards a 
banking union, namely the centralisation of 
financial supervision in the hands of the ECB, 
implies a proper devolution of sovereignty from 
the national to the European level, which – if 
implemented – would mark a quantum leap in the 
process of European integration and the much 
awaited move towards some form of political 
union, even if the time frame remains indefinite 
and unpredictable. 
Measure for measure 
The measures agreed at the June European Council 
may be divided into three blocs: short-term 
measures, long-term measures, and short-term 
ones with long-term effects.  
Short-term. It was decided that the European 
Financial Stabilization Fund (EFSF) and its 
successor European Stabilization Mechanism 
(ESM) may be used to directly purchase 
government bonds on markets, with the ECB 
acting as agent. The plan reaffirms the idea that 
some countries are too big to be saved, but are not 
so big that they cannot be helped. The 
compromise between supporters and opponents of 
the plan was reached half-way: support is thus 
provided only to countries that respect deficit and 
debt levels and obey by the country-specific 
recommendations the EU delivers every year to 
Member States under the European Semester 
process. Moreover, support is granted on a 
discretionary fashion and on a country-by-country 
basis: hence it is not automatic, which implies that 
it could well happen that the Council decides 
against it.  
Long-term. The European Council also laid down 
the elements of the EU banking union by 
suggesting that financial supervision, which is now 
in the hands of national supervisors, be transferred 
to the ECB by the end of the year. In this case, too, 
the technical details are missing. For example, it 
would make a difference whether EU supervision 
concerns just large banks or all banks – including 
German Landesbanken, which are relatively small 
but characterised by strong territorial and political 
ties. If implemented, supranational supervision 
implies that national authorities accept to give up 
on the so far cosy relationship with “their” banks. 
This would represent the quantum leap in the 
management of the crisis many observers have 
been looking for. In fact, once supervision has 
been transferred to the European level, will it be 
possible for the ESM to directly recapitalise 
Spanish banks for an amount of 100bn euro, so 
that the loan does not hinge on government 
balance sheets, thereby partly breaking the negative 
loop between sovereign debts and banks.  
Short-term with long-term effects. Announced 
already a month earlier, the Growth Pact agreed at 
the European Council consists of 120 billion euro 
to finance large investment projects, of which 55 
billion in outstanding Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, a 10-billion rise in the capital of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) – which will 
allow raising capital for 60 billion – and, finally, 5.5 
billion to finance the first “pilot” project bond. The 
fresh capital the Growth Pact is injecting is limited 
to the 10 billion euro needed to increase the EIB’s 
lending capacity for large infrastructural projects 
1 Slowly but steadily  
By Benedicta Marzinotto*  
Benedicta Marzinotto is Research Fellow at BRUEGEL, Brussels, and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Natolin. 
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after the Bank had been subject to significant 
deleveraging over the last months. On the other 
hand, Structural and Cohesion Funds are not new 
as they are part of the cohesion policy 
disbursements that had been already adopted at the 
beginning of the current Multiannual Financial 
Perspective (MFF). Finally, “project bonds” had 
been already agreed in the past and represent a new 
tool to support investment – for which, however, 
the EU would only provide credit enhancement 
(the bonds are in fact issued by private entities, 
which means that they work best in good times). 
To sum up, the European Council built on the 
letter of the four Presidents to launch 
supranational financial supervision, a stepping 
stone in the creation of a EU banking union. It 
added the decision of using the EFSF/ESM in a 
more flexible manner, mostly as a deterrent for 
financial markets. And it finalised the main 
elements of the Growth Pact that was de facto 
already agreed at the ECOFIN of 23 May.  
However, the European Council was silent on 
fiscal union. The letter of the four floated a very 
embryonic and timid fiscal union by suggesting 
that the European Commission can propose 
amendments to national budget drafts before they 
are approved by national parliaments. But 
something similar is already in the making and 
being negotiated, in the ordinary legislative 
procedure, by the Council and the European 
Parliament. As a matter of fact, back in November 
2011, the European Commission proposed the so-
called Two Pack, a package of two legislative 
procedures empowering the Commission to look 
into national budget drafts before they are 
approved by national parliaments, with the purpose 
of recommending amendments early on and 
making sure they are in line with the country-
specific recommendations the EU addresses to 
Member States every year in the framework of the 
European Semester. Failure to refer to the 
adoption of a similar idea at the summit probably 
signals unwillingness to explicitly intervene on a 
subject that is being decided upon in parallel 
through standard EU legislative tools.  
The next steps 
Are the suggested measures a permanent solution 
to the European debt crisis? Implementation risks 
lie ahead. Failure to transfer financial supervision 
to the ECB would be extremely counterproductive, 
as it would clearly unveil the political constraints in 
the construction of a more united EU (or euro 
zone). Another important aspect is economic 
growth: the momentum to support growth-related 
measures (including the possibility of excluding 
forms of public investment from the calculation of 
the public deficit) should not be lost.  
Finally, it is essential that the Fiscal Compact, 
currently going through the process of national 
ratification, becomes operative in 2013. There has 
indeed been much talk about it for a number of 
reasons. First, it is unclear what it adds to the 
already approved Six Pack which is in force since 
December 2011. Second, it is an intergovernmental 
Treaty that seems to overshadow the “community 
method” upon which the Six Pack is based. Third, 
it covers all EU Member States but in fact only 25 
have agreed to it.  
Whilst its relation with the Six Pack is still 
uncertain and will be clarified only once the Treaty 
starts operating, the Fiscal Compact has two 
important merits which should not be 
underestimated. First, it is bringing economic 
policy coordination back to a rule-based system. In 
the midst of the crisis, most of the emergency 
measures approved in support of vulnerable 
countries were decided at Council and European 
Council level, thus altering the nature of inter-state 
relations in the EU: from being rule-based, the 
system became progressively power-based, 
unleashing strong nationalistic sentiments. The 
signatories of the Fiscal Compact have de facto 
taken responsibility for redirecting the EU towards 
a rule-based system, which should help mitigate 
power conflicts. Second, the Fiscal Compact goes a 
step further than the Six Pack as it suggests that 
reversed qualified majority voting (RQMV) may be 
applied also at stages in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) – where the Six Pack itself does 
not foresee such a strong role for the European 
Commission. Once again, Member States sign up 
to the fact that the Commission’s intervention 
rights need strengthening.  
The Six Pack, the Fiscal Compact and the Two 
Pack do therefore represent, especially when taken 
all together, an important step towards a fiscal 
union still in the making.  
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The June 2012 euro zone European Council is a 
harbinger of deep change for European banks. 
By moving banking supervision of the euro zone 
to the European Central Bank (ECB) – in return 
for the direct recapitalisation of banks by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – a huge 
step towards a more federal banking model has 
been taken. This move should allow a gradual 
de-nationalisation of banking and more 
independent and streamlined supervision, which 
is what a “banking union” is all about. But the 
decision will have to be taken to its full extent: it 
has far-reaching implications and raises many 
questions, essentially of an operational and legal 
nature as well as scope. And it moves the EU-17 
further ahead of the “Outs”, the non-euro 
countries. These matters will have to be clarified 
in the coming weeks, thus implying an enormous 
workload for the European Commission, the 
Council and the ECB to be ready before the end 
of the year. 
“We affirm that it is imperative to break the 
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” 
The opening statement of the euro zone Council 
conclusions sums it all up. Banks should not 
necessarily be penalised for the fiscal position 
adopted by their home countries. Since the 
beginning of the financial crisis, the funding 
costs of banks have started to follow the funding 
costs of their sovereign, thus creating a very “un-
level” playing field in the single market. Bank 
recapitalisation by the ESM, combined with 
Europe-wide supervision, should allow us to 
break that circle, although this will not happen 
automatically. 
EBA back to its core business  
Barely two years have passed since the launch of 
European Banking Authority (EBA), and now 
supervision is set to move to the ECB, on the 
basis of Article 127(6) of the Treaty. This 
decision should not be too difficult to 
implement, as banks are not under the 
supervision of the central bank in only four 
smaller euro zone countries (Estonia, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Malta). This will give the ECB 
direct access to supervisory information of euro 
zone licensed banks, and allow it to do what the 
EBA did not manage to do sufficiently: namely, 
instruct and oversee national supervisory 
authorities. But the decision has to be taken 
unanimously by the EU finance ministers and, 
although the UK Treasury has indicated that it is 
in favour of this move, other non-euro zone 
countries might still object. 
The Banking Union relegates the EBA to 
carrying out essentially its regulatory tasks for the 
single market in an EU-27 framework, which is 
probably the way it should be. The EBA’s 
supervisory tasks were in any case exceptional or 
difficult to implement, but can continue for the 
“Outs”, where a supervisory oversight does not 
land automatically on the ECB’s desk. Clarifying 
this problem avoids the threat of the old Meroni 
and related case law – dating back to the famous 
ruling by the European Court of Justice (1957-
58) on the conditions under which a delegation 
of powers could be granted to a new entity – 
which stated that the European Commission 
cannot delegate tasks it is not allowed to exercise 
itself. 
For its part, the other entity created as a result of 
the financial crisis – the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) – could see its role enhanced as a 
result of the re-shuffle, and become the macro-
prudential entity within the ECB. It may be 
worth recalling that, in the negotiations on the 
ESRB regulation, member states insisted that the 
confidentiality of supervisory information be 
respected. Its Art. 15.3 states that supervisory 
information can only be passed on to the ESRB 
(and thus the ECB), “as a rule, in summary or 
aggregate form so that individual financial 
institutions cannot be identified.” 
A euro zone banking federation? 
The June 29th decision will bring about a sea 
change for cross-border banks and supervisors in 
the euro zone. Rather than having to face 
multiple supervisory authorities, such banks will 
2 The banking union cup must be drunk to the last drop  
By Karel Lannoo*  
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now have only one licence and a single 
supervisor for the entire euro zone, doing away 
with the home country and the supervisory 
colleges (at least, yet again, within the euro zone). 
In practice, a two-tier system with local 
supervision will continue for small banks – but 
the rules and the supervision should be exactly 
the same, thus giving a significant new boost to 
cross-border mergers. 
The euro zone Council decision also means that 
a homogeneous deposit insurance system and a 
single resolution regime for the euro zone should 
emerge. Interestingly, both elements were 
mentioned in the four Presidents’ paper, but not 
in the euro zone Council conclusions. If the 
ESM will be used for recapitalisations, this also 
means that the same rules must be applied across 
the euro zone regarding bail-outs. The 
Commission proposal on the subject, published 
on June 7th, suggested harmonised rules, but left 
implementation to member state authorities. An 
earlier proposal on deposit guarantee schemes 
also left a large degree of discretion to the 
member states. Both will have to be changed 
now as a result of the Council decision. But the 
euro zone Council will not be able to wait for the 
decision on the EU Crisis Management 
Directive, as the recapitalisation of Bankia is 
urgent and should take place once the 
supervision has moved to the ECB – that is, by 
the end of the year. 
As with its counterpart in the US, the Federal 
Reserve, the ECB is thus becoming a broad 
central bank – namely one which, apart from 
executing monetary policy, will also supervise the 
payment and settlement system as well as the 
banks themselves. This metamorphosis from a 
narrow central bank, focusing on price stability 
only, has occurred in a period of only 15 years. It 
is an acknowledgement and a reward for the 
ECB’s stature in general, and in specific for its 
management of the financial crisis. It remains to 
be seen whether this move will re-establish 
confidence, restore the euro interbank market, 
and re-launch financial integration. 
Family picture of the European Council of 28-29 June in Brussels. 
bepa monthly brief 
June 2012 – Issue 57 
7 
 
The European “Fiscal Compact”: A goal or a 
starting point? 
In this commentary, António Vitorino considers 
the Treaty on stability, coordination and 
governance (TSCG) as a key political instrument 
at the service of the recent European solidarity-
responsibility dialectic: find a new balance 
between national responsibilities and European 
solidarity. He maintains that the TSCG should 
pave the way fors deepening European solidarity 
and much a wider European economic strategy. 
In view of the June 2012 European Council, he 
recommends adding three elements to the TSCG: 
an additional protocol on growth which should 
include increasing EU investment and deepening 
the single market; a more a positive “Economic 
Union” based on a comprehensive vision of the 
interdependence between the euro zone countries; 
and the application of the “solidarity-control” 
dialectic to the banking sector through the 
establishment of a “Banking Union”. 
h t t p : / / w w w . n o t r e - e u r o p e . e u / u p l o a d s /
t x _ p u b l i c a t i o n /
FiscalCompact_A.Vitorino_EESC_June2012_01.pdf 
Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro 
Area: Symptom or cause of the crisis? 
Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. 
The global credit boom of the last decade led to 
large capital flows across the world, including 
large movements of resources from the Northern 
countries of the euro zone to the Southern part. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, and more 
markedly after 2009, these flows have suddenly 
stopped, creating severe adjustment pressures. To 
correct the current imbalances, the main effort 
has to come from individual countries. This paper 
argues that, at this point, the common monetary 
policy can only try to mitigate the unavoidable 
adjustment by maintaining overall financial 
stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate 
balance between providing liquidity for solvent 
institutions and keeping the overall pressure on 
for a rapid correction of the imbalances. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/macroeconomic-imbalances-
euro-area-symptom-or-cause-crisis 
Arithmetic is Absolute: Euro area adjustment  
The European Central Bank’s monetary policy 
targets the euro zone average inflation rate. By 
setting conditions for the area as a whole, it 
should ensure symmetric price adjustment. 
Indeed, consumer price inflation rates provide 
little evidence of asymmetric adjustment for 2009-
11. Only Ireland, which is too small to trigger a 
symmetric reaction, had significantly lower 
inflation rates than the average. Some asymmetry 
is visible in total economy unit labour costs (ULC) 
during 2009-11, whereas wages appear to develop 
more symmetrically. ULC adjustment has been 
largely disconnected from consumer price 
developments. This makes it difficult for the 
monetary transmission channel to operate fully 
and ensure consumer price adjustments. 
Structural reforms to remove price rigidities are 
essential. Less inflation in Italy and more inflation 
in Germany are urgently needed to achieve 
rebalancing in the euro zone. 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/724-arithmetic-is-absolute-euro-area-
adjustment/ 
The Path towards a Two-Speed Europe 
The paper explains that while the EU has become 
an essential partner on the world scene because of 
the euro, EU powers appeared inadequate, its 
financial resources insufficient, and decision-
making slow during the euro crisis. As events 
unfolded, the euro problem has proven to be one 
of lack of political will at the heart of European 
governance. The “power vacuums” in the 
European institutions call for remedies. To 
proceed, there are two possible pathways: either 
Europeans turn their backs on integration or they 
accelerate their progression toward it. The author 
holds that it is highly probable that a new EU 
treaty will be signed by a group of able and willing 
countries which decide to enter into a more 
advanced form of integration, thus forming a 
two-speed Europe. 
h t t p : / / w w w . g m f u s . o r g / w p - c o n t e n t /
files_mf/1336746505CHEVALLARD_PathTowar
dsTwoSpeedEurope_May12.pdf 
3 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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European Neighbourhood Policy Package – 
Conclusions for the Eastern partners  
An analysis of the outcomes of changes to the EU 
policy towards the European Eastern 
neighbourhood and the South Caucasus suggests 
that revisions aimed at addressing the changing 
political landscape in the region, rather than 
implementing a substantial reform of the 
neighbourhood policy. The ENP is largely based 
on bureaucratic procedures, which have only a 
limited capacity to bring about lasting change in 
the region, as the deterioration of democratic 
standards in a number of countries demonstrates. 
EU instruments have limited influence on the 
situation in Eastern Partnership countries and the 
region’s significance on the EU agenda is 
declining. In response to this, EU policy on 
Eastern Europe will focus to a larger extent on 
technical and sectoral cooperation (e.g. trade 
agreements, visa facilitation agreements, mobility 
partnerships). 
ht tp ://www.osw .waw.p l/en/publ ikac j e/osw-
commentary/2012-05-25/european-neighbourhood-policy-
package-conclusions-eastern-partn 
Europe in the World: Contemporary 
challenges & opportunities for improvement 
In this paper, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Steven 
Vanackere provides a comprehensive and frank 
analysis of five major challenges for the EU: (1) 
organising the new global governance; (2) 
improving relations with Europe’s changing 
neighbourhood; (3) engaging with strategic 
partners; (4) responding to conflicts and 
humanitarian crises; and (5) tackling climate 
change and resource security. In response, the 
author calls for: establishing permanent EU 
Military Headquarters for the conduct of EU 
civilian/military operations; abolishing the 
“unanimity rule” in CFSP-related decision-
making; more permanent forms of EU and 
eurozone representation in the G20, World Bank 
and IMF; and strengthening the European 
External Action Service (including shared analysis 
of events and crises as well as “smarter” 
cooperation between the 27 diplomatic national 
services). 
http ://www.globalgovernance . eu/images/
d o c u m e n t s /
ggi_analysis_europe_in_the_world_vanackere.pdf 
Growth, Well-Being and Social Policy in 
Europe 
This new issue of Challenge Europe addresses the 
question of how to turn social policy into an 
effective productive factor, enabling the well-
being of Europeans and economic growth. Based 
on the argument that social policy can contribute 
to long-term sustainable growth, this multi-author 
publication focuses on those policies which can 
potentially bring the most added value to citizens’ 
life. The authors first explore the possible 
synergies between growth, well-being and social 
policy, before turning to those policy areas where 
intervention can be most effective: social 
innovation; the role of older people; bridging 
socio-economic inequality; and boosting work-
family balance. Finally, the authors examine the 
EU’s room of manoeuvre and propose specific 
policy actions: investing in education; health 
promotion; strengthening democratic legitimacy; 
building a competitive Europe; and tackling the 
implications of the long-term growth crisis. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e p c . e u / p u b _ d e t a i l s . p h p ?
cat_id=7&pub_id=1281 
Is the UK Jumping or Being Pushed? British 
separatism after Cameron’s EU veto 
Since the December 2011 European Council, 
there has been speculation about a “domino 
secession”: the UK would break away from the 
EU, causing Scotland to secede from Britain. Any 
such British separatism would fly in the face of 
academic expectations: national groups that are 
heavily represented in the political process – as 
Scotland is in the UK, and the UK is in the EU – 
are usually deemed unlikely to reach for the exit. 
One particular strand of analysis might, however, 
explain these developments. Academics have 
shown that separatism at the periphery can be the 
result of exclusionary forces from the centre. 
Each State aspires to maximise its voice, which 
causes fragmentation and undermines the success 
of the more influential member states. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
products/comments/2012C15_mrr_pks.pdf 
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Arrivées 
Nous avons eu le plaisir d’accueillir en juin deux 
nouveaux collègues, experts financiers; au sein de 
l’unité de coordination : Julian García Rosado, du 
Secrétariat Général, et Isabelle Declère, venant de 
la DG AGRI. 
Activités 
Le 6 juin, un déjeuner organisé par la conseillère 
scientifique en chef du Président, Anne Glover, a 
réuni le Président Barroso et 11 représentants des 
sciences et technologies. Cet événement a permis 
aux participants d’échanger leurs vues et 
expériences sur le domaine des sciences et de la 
politique de la science.  
Le 7 juin, le BEPA a accueilli les “40 under 40”, 
un programme créé par les organisations “Friends 
of Europe” et “Europanova” réunissant 40 
leaders européens de moins de 40 ans. Les jeunes 
leaders ont eu l’occasion de discuter avec le 
président du Conseil Herman van Rompuy et de 
prendre part à un débat animé et fructueux sur 
l’avenir économique de l’Europe avec Philippe 
Legrain, Conseiller principal et chef de l’équipe 
Analyse du BEPA, et le député européen Pablo 
Zalba Bidegain. 
Du 18 au 20 juin 2012, sous les auspices de la 
présidence danoise de l’UE, le Groupe Européen 
d’Ethique (GEE), le Comité national d’éthique 
(CNE) danois, le Dialogue international sur la 
bioéthique (regroupant les présidents des CNE 
G20 et le Forum des 27 de l’UE CNE) se sont 
rencontrés à Copenhague pour discuter des 
questions éthiques liées à la politique énergétique 
et la sécurité alimentaire.  
Le 21 juin, le directeur général du BEPA, Jean-
Claude Thébault, a présenté le projet ESPAS 
(European Strategy and Policy Analysis System) 
au centre de réflexion prospective parisien 
“Futuribles”.  
Le même jour, la taskforce interinstitutionnelle 
ESPAS s’est réunie au Parlement européen en 
présence du Secrétaire Général du Parlement 
européen Klaus Welle.  
Le 22 juin, le BEPA a accueilli le chercheur Philip 
Connor, qui a présenté à des représentants de la 
Commission et du Service européen d’action 
extérieure, les principales conclusions de son 
rapport consacré à la religion et à la migration 
internationale publié récemment par le Pew 
Research Center’s “Forum on Religion & Public 
Life”.  
Dans le cadre du projet ESPAS (European 
Strategy and Policy Analysis System), la taskforce 
interinstitutionnelle a reçu Mat Burrows and 
David Armitage, du centre d’études stratégiques 
américain National Intelligence Council (NIC) qui 
ont présenté leur rapport portant sur les 
tendances globales de 2030 et sur les scénarios 
prospectifs consacrés à l’Europe et la Russie.  
Toujours dans le cadre du programme 
interinstitutionnel ESPAS, le BEPA a publié au 
“Supplément au Journal officiel de l’Union 
européenne” du 29 juin 2012, trois appels d’offres 
pour la réalisation de trois études portant sur les 
défis auxquels sera confrontée l’Union 
européenne d’ici à 2030. Chacune des études 
s’articulera autour d’un des trois axes suivants: 
“ é c o n o m i e ”  ( 2 0 1 2 / S  1 2 3 - 2 0 2 1 8 9 ) , 
“société” (2012/S 123-202190) et “gouvernance 
et pouvoir” (2012/S 123-202191). 
Le 27 juin, Margaritis Schinas, chef adjoint du 
BEPA, des conseillers du BEPA et Michael 
Karnitschnig, membre du cabinet Barroso, ont été 
reçus par l’unité de planification politique de 
l’OTAN au siège de l’organisation à Bruxelles 
pour échanger leurs vues sur l’avenir de la région 
des Balkans occidentaux, notamment dans le 
cadre du processus d’élargissement.  
Activités à venir 
Le 12 juillet, 22 hauts dignitaires des trois religions 
monothéistes et de deux autres religions 
mondiales rencontreront le Président de la 
Commission José Manuel Barroso, le Président du 
Conseil Herman van Rompuy et le Vice-Président 
du Parlement européen Laszló Surján. Dans le 
cadre de l’année européenne 2012 pour le 
vieillissement actif et la solidarité entre les 
générations, les participants discuteront des défis 
de la solidarité entre les générations en Europe au 
regard de la crise actuelle.  
Du 11 au 15 juillet, la conseillère scientifique en 
chef du président, Prof. Anne Glover, participera 
à l’“Euroscience Open Forum”, le plus grand 
événement consacré à la science en Europe, à 
Dublin.  
Les 16 et 17 juillet, les rapporteurs du Groupe 
Européen d’Ethique se réuniront à Rome.  
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